Postacute care is thought to be a major source of wasteful spending. The extent to which accountable care organizations (ACOs) can limit postacute care spending has implications for the importance and design of other payment models that include postacute care. 
mon type of postacute facility used and are reimbursed by Medicare on a per diem basis. Excessive use of postacute SNF care is thought to be a major source of wasteful spending and a natural target for health care professionals participating in new payment models that reward them for reducing spending below a budget, such as the Medicare accountable care organization (ACO) programs and Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative. 3 Through the first full year of operation, evaluations of the Medicare ACO programs-including the Pioneer model and Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)-found proportionately larger savings in spending on SNFs than in other categories, suggesting that ACOs are indeed focusing on postacute care in their strategies to reduce spending. 4, 5 These early gains are consistent with expectations that wasteful spending is easier to reduce when it is more abundant and with the stronger incentives that ACOs have to limit use of services they do not provide relative to services they do provide. [4] [5] [6] [7] Specifically, because most ACOs do not include SNFs in their organizations or ACO contract, 8, 9 shared-savings bonuses achieved by lowering spending on SNF care are typically not offset by foregone fee-for-service profits. The early reductions in SNF spending also suggest that organizations can successfully influence care in facilities they do not own. 4, 5, 10, 11 For example, ACOs can direct patients to a preferred network of more efficient SNFs and can employ, or partner with, clinicians and case managers to follow the care of patients in SNFs. [12] [13] [14] Research to date, however, has not demonstrated the extent of savings in postacute care in the ACO programs after 2013, the source of these savings, or the strategies used to achieve them.
Methods

Study Overview
In the MSSP, ACOs receive shared-savings bonuses if they hold total Medicare spending sufficiently below a budget (or benchmark) and meet minimum performance standards. Using Medicare claims from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2014, we conducted difference-in-differences comparisons to estimate changes in spending on postacute care and use of postacute care associated with participation in the MSSP. Specifically, we compared beneficiaries served by MSSP ACOs with beneficiaries in ACO service areas served by nonparticipating health care professionals (control group) before vs after the start of ACO contracts. We separately examined each cohort of ACOs entering the MSSP in 2012, 2013, and 2014, as previous evaluations have demonstrated that savings differ by year of entry. 5, 11 We conducted 4 sets of analyses. First, to obtain overall population estimates, we analyzed inpatient, postacute care facility, and home health spending among all beneficiaries, with patient-years as the units of analysis. Second, to eliminate changes in the use of postacute care due to changes in hospital admission rates, we analyzed use of postacute care and postacute care spending conditional on hospitalization, with admissions as the units of analysis. Third, to isolate spending reductions owing to shorter length of SNF stays, we analyzed SNF spending and length of stay conditional on discharge to a SNF, with SNF stays as the units of analysis. Fourth, we analyzed 30-day readmissions, use of highly rated SNFs, and mortality to assess associated changes in quality of care.
We then conducted additional analyses to further characterize mechanisms for changes in postacute care. Specifically, we tested whether changes in postacute care for hospitalized ACO patients were the result of hospital-wide changes or changes in care selectively affecting ACO patients within hospitals. In a related subgroup analysis, we compared results between ACOs with and without financial ties to hospitals. Although independent physician groups without such ties might still influence discharge planning for their patients within hospitals, 10 ACOs that are financially integrated with hospitals are more likely to have the additional option of implementing hospital-wide strategies. Finally, we assessed the extent to which changes in SNF spending and length of stay were due to the use of different SNFs vs changes in care for ACO patients within SNFs. The study was approved by the Harvard Medical School Committee on Human Studies and the Privacy Board of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
Study Population
For each study year from 2009 to 2014, we analyzed data from Medicare claims and enrollment files for a random 20% sample of fee-for-service beneficiaries continuously enrolled in Parts A and B in that year (while alive for decedents) and in the previous year (to assess preexisting conditions). Using previously described methods 5 attributed each beneficiary in each study year to the ACO or non-ACO taxpayer identification number accounting for the most allowed charges for office visits with a primary care physician during that year (eAppendix in the Supplement). In sensitivity analyses, we modified definitions of ACOs to address potential bias from changes in constituent taxpayer identification numbers and physicians over time (eAppendix in the Supplement).
We excluded beneficiaries without a visit with a primary care physician. As this was a secondary data analysis of claims, no primary data were collected and there was no intervention requiring patient consent. Beneficiary-level identifying information was not included in the data files.
Study Variables
Acute and Postacute Care Spending and Use For analyses of all beneficiaries in our study sample, we assessed annual per-beneficiary Medicare spending for inpatient care, care in postacute facilities (overall and by facility type), and home health care initiated in the community (outpatient) vs care after a hospitalization or postacute facility stay (postacute). Facility types included SNFs, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, and long-term care hospitals. For admission-level analyses, we assessed the following variables for the postacute period: discharge to a facility vs home, spending for facility stays and number of covered days spent in a facility (by facility type), and spending for home health care and number of days of home health care. We defined the postacute period to begin at hospital discharge and end at the conclusion of any episode of postacute care (inclusive of transfers between facilities and of home health care following hospital or postacute facility stays), at the start of another hospitalization if the patient was hospitalized while receiving postacute care, or at discharge if no postacute care was provided. Admissions with no stay at a postacute facility or home health care were given values of zero for measures of postacute care spending and use during the postacute period. In addition, we determined the diagnosis related group payment weight, inpatient spending, and length of stay for each admission to test whether reductions in admissions achieved by ACOs led to changes in case mix among patients admitted in the postcontract period. For analyses of postacute SNF stays, we assessed spending per stay and length of stay.
Quality of Care
We examined 3 measures to detect potential changes in quality of care associated with participation in the MSSP. First, we assessed annual mortality in the beneficiary-level analysis of the full study sample. Second, for both admission-level and SNF stay-level analyses, we assessed readmissions within 30 days of hospital discharge. We examined readmissions because they are included as a quality measure in ACO contracts and because reductions in readmission rates could mechanically lengthen postacute facility stays and thus influence interpretation of results. Third, for SNF stay-level analyses, we determined the star rating for the SNF to which beneficiaries were discharged from publicly available Nursing Home Compare data. 16 The star rating is a composite of ratings from health inspections, 16 quality measures, and staffing, blending both short and long stays. We used Nursing Home Compare data from each study year to create an indicator for being discharged to a 4-star or 5-star (highly rated) facility. 
Statistical Analysis
We fit linear regression models predicting each dependent variable as a function of ACO fixed effects (omitting the control group as the reference group), fixed effects for the beneficiary's hospital referral region (HRR) of residence, year fixed effects, interactions between HRR and year fixed effects, the patient characteristics listed in Table 1 , and indicators for each ACO cohort in each postcontract year. For each ACO cohort, the last set of indicators estimated changes from the precontract period to each postcontract year for beneficiaries attributed to ACOs that differed from local concurrent changes for beneficiaries attributed to non-ACO health care professionals (the estimate of interest). Interactions between these indicators and ACO subgroups were added for subgroup comparisons. The ACO fixed effects adjusted for precontract differences between each ACO and the control group, as well as for changes in the distribution of beneficiaries across ACOs. The fixed effects for HRR by year combinations adjusted for geographical differences between the ACO and control groups and for HRR-specific changes in the use of acute or postacute care in the control group. d Statistically different from zero at a P < .01 level.
e Statistically different from zero at a P < .05 level.
f Race/ethnicity was determined from Medicare master beneficiary summary files.
g Indicates that disability was the original reason for Medicare eligibility.
h Chronic conditions from the CCW included the following 27 conditions: acute myocardial infarction, Alzheimer disease, Alzheimer disease and related disorders or senile dementia, anemia, asthma, atrial fibrillation, benign prostatic hyperplasia, chronic kidney disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, depression, diabetes, heart failure, hip or pelvic fracture, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, hypothyroidism, ischemic heart disease, osteoporosis, rheumatoid arthritis or osteoarthritis, stroke or transient ischemic attack, breast cancer, colorectal cancer, endometrial cancer, lung cancer, prostate cancer, cataracts, and glaucoma. Indicators for all 27 conditions were included in analytic models, as well as indicators of having multiple (Ն2 through Ն9) conditions. Counts of conditions presented in the table include all conditions except cataracts and glaucoma.
i HCC risk scores are derived from demographic and diagnostic data in Medicare enrollment and claims files, with higher scores indicating higher predicted spending in the subsequent year. For each beneficiary in each study year, we assessed the HCC score based on enrollment and claims data in the prior year.
j DRG payment weights, length of stay, and inpatient spending were used as additional measures to assess whether case mix for the admission-level and SNF stay-level analyses differentially changed as a result of differential changes in admission and SNF stay rates. For the analysis of SNF stays, these measures were assessed for the admission preceding each SNF stay. Thus, we used precontract levels for ACOs and local concurrent changes from the precontract to postcontract period in the control group to establish counterfactuals that would be expected in the absence of participation in the MSSP, and we estimated differences from this expectation (ie, the differential change or the change attributable to MSSP participation). The precontract period in the model differed by ACO cohort: 2009 to 2011 for the 2012 cohort, 2009 to 2012 for the 2013 cohort, and 2009 to 2013 for the 2014 cohort. Models of admissions and SNF stays additionally included diagnosis related group fixed effects. We used robust variance estimators to account for clustering within ACOs (for the ACO group) or HRRs (for the control group). 23 We conducted admission-level analyses with and without fixed effects for each hospital by year combination to determine the extent to which differential changes in postacute care were due to within-hospital changes in care specifically for ACO patients vs hospital-wide changes affecting postacute care for all admitted patients (by comparing estimates from models with and without the fixed effects). We similarly conducted SNF stay-level analyses with and without SNF fixed effects to determine the extent to which differential changes in SNF spending and length of stay were due to discharges of ACO patients to different facilities vs changes in care specifically for ACO patients within SNFs.
As prespecified in our study protocol, we took several measures to limit the number of statistical tests that were conducted for supporting inferences. First, we focused on measures of SNF use and spending as our main outcomes and considered spending on SNF care to be the primary outcome, because such spending was the main source of savings in postacute care in Medicare ACO programs in their first full year of operation.
4,5 Second, we conducted admission-level analyses only for ACO cohorts with significant differential changes in SNF spending in beneficiary-level analyses, and we conducted SNF stay-level analyses only for ACO cohorts with significant differential changes in admission-level analyses. Third, we considered tests of differential changes in 2014 as primary, given evidence of growing savings in the MSSP from 2013 and 2014. 11 We present 2013 estimates for descriptive purposes, except that we pooled estimates across 2013 and 2014 in subgroup comparisons to enhance precision. We treated 2012 as a transition year for the 2012 ACO cohort, effectively excluding it from both the precontract and postcontract periods, because ACOs in this cohort entered in April or July rather than January. We conducted additional analyses to explore potential sources of bias. First, we compared trends in each outcome between each ACO cohort and the control group during the precontract period. Similar precontract trends would support our assumption that changes from the precontract to postcontract periods would have been similar for the ACO and control groups in the absence of the ACO programs. Second, we tested whether patient characteristics and inpatient admission characteristics differentially changed from the precontract to postcontract period in the ACO groups relative to the control group.
Results
Beneficiary-level analyses included 25 544 650 patient-years from 2009 to 2014, with approximately 19% of beneficiaries attributed to ACOs annually on average. Admission-level analyses included 8 395 426 admissions and SNF stay-level analyses included 1 595 352 SNF stays. In analyses adjusted only for geography, differences in patient characteristics between ACO-attributed beneficiaries and the control group in the precontract period were mostly small (eTable 1 in the Supplement) and changed minimally from the precontract period to 2014 (Table 1 ). In analyses of admissions and SNF stays, differential changes in patient characteristics, diagnosis related group payment weights, spending per admission, and admission length of stay also were minimal (Table 1) . Adjusted precontract trends in all dependent variables were similar for ACOattributed beneficiaries and the control group, as were adjusted precontract means for most measures ( Tables 2, 3 , and 4 and eTables 2 and 3 in the Supplement).
Beneficiary-Level Analysis 2012 Entry Cohort
In comparisons of ACOs entering the MSSP in 2012 with the control group, participation in the MSSP was associated with reductions in total annual inpatient spending (differential change in 2014 for ACOs vs control group, −$77 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$132 to -$22], or −2.3% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $3400; P = .006) and spending on postacute care in facilities (−$106 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$176 to -$35], or −9.0% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $1172; P = .003), with the latter driven mostly by reduced spending on SNF care (Table 2) . Participation in the MSSP was also associated with a differential reduction in spending in 2014 for home health care in the outpatient setting (−$16 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$31 to -$1], or −3.1% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $522; P = .03) but not in the postacute care setting ($2 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$2 to $6], or 1.9% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $108; P = .31). In 2013, differential changes for ACOs in the 2012 entry cohort in inpatient spending and SNF spending were smaller than differential changes in 2014 (Table 2) . (Table 3) . Estimates were largely unchanged after adjustment for hospital-level means in the year of admission, indicating that reductions in SNF use were due to different treatment of ACO-attributed patients within hospitals.
ACO Entry Cohort
For the 2013 MSSP cohort (eTable 3 in the Supplement), the differential change in 2014 in postacute care SNF spending was not statistically significant (−$50 per admission [95% CI, -$102 to $3], or −2.3% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $2207; P = .07), so SNF stay-level analyses were not pursued.
SNF Stay-Level Analysis
For the 2012 entry cohort of ACOs (Table 4) , participation in the MSSP was associated with significant reductions in spending per SNF stay (differential change in 2014, −$393 per stay [95% CI, -$558 to -$229], or −3.5% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $11 206; P < .001) and length of SNF stay (−0.60 days per stay [95% CI, -0.99 to -0.22], or −2.2% of the precontract unadjusted mean of 27.07; P = .002). Adjustment for the SNF to which patients were discharged reduced these estimates by 23% to 25%, indicating that most of these reductions were due to changes in care specifically for ACO patients within SNFs rather than shifts to different SNFs.
Subgroup Analysis
Estimated reductions in inpatient and SNF spending associated with participation in the MSSP were consistently greater in the 2012 and 2013 entry cohorts for independent physician groups than for ACOs that were financially integrated with hospitals, but these differences were not statistically significant (Figure and eFigure in the Supplement).
Quality of Care
Participation in the MSSP was not associated with differential changes in mortality (Table 2 and eTable 2 in the Supplement), 30-day readmissions (Tables 3 and 4 and eTable 3 in the Supplement), or the proportion of patients discharged to 4-star or 5-star SNFs (Table 4) .
Discussion
Spending on postacute SNF care for patients of ACOs entering the MSSP in 2012 or 2013 was significantly reduced in 2014 longer ACO participation, and later entrants required more time to achieve reductions than did early entrants. Reductions in spending on SNF care for ACO patients were due in part to lower use of inpatient care, in part to lower rates of discharge to SNFs, and in part to shorter length of SNF stays. Adjustment for the hospital or SNF to which patients were admitted revealed that reductions in SNF use and length of stay for ACO patients were largely due to within-hospital changes in care specifically for ACO patients, as opposed to hospital-wide efforts, and to changes in care within SNFs for ACO patients, as opposed to use of different SNFs. Spending reductions in postacute care were achieved without ostensibly compromising or improving the quality of care for ACO patients, based on mortality, readmissions, and use of highly rated SNFs. Reductions in spending on SNF care associated with participation in the MSSP were statistically similar for independent physician groups and organizations financially integrated with hospitals, with higher estimates for independent groups contributing to their greater overall savings, as previously described. 5, 11 On one hand, financial integration with hospitals offers ACOs potential economies of scale for discharge planning and forming preferred SNF networks. On the other hand, hospitals in ACOs have weak incentives to pursue hospital-wide strategies to limit wasteful postacute care because patients attributed under an organization's ACO contract typically account for only a small proportion of admissions to the organization's hospitals. Moreover, compared with hospital-integrated ACOs, those that are independent physician groups report a similar capacity for influencing inpatient care-and thus decisions about postacute care at discharge-presumably by staffing admissions directly or using hospitalist groups or care managers to influence their patients' inpatient care. 10 Our results are consistent with ACOs using similar strategies to shorten length of SNF stays, such as employing or partnering with clinicians to follow the care of patients in SNFs. Thus, although hospitals may ostensibly be better positioned to influence postacute care than are physician groups, they may have limited financial incentives to develop strategies that differ from those available to physician groups. 7 Incentives for hospitals in ACOs may change as bundled payment initiatives expand, but our results suggest that financial integration with hospitals is not necessary for ACOs to achieve sizable savings in the postacute care setting. These findings in turn provide valuable information for clinicians considering employment changes to meet the challenges of payment reform and for practices trying to gauge their potential reach of influence and success under new payment models. Our study also has important implications for Medicare payment policy and antitrust law enforcement. Under current and proposed payment programs that bundle acute and postacute care (eg, the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative), hospitals keep any savings within the bundle for patients attributed to an ACO participating in the MSSP.
24,25 Because ACOs may be able to achieve postacute care savings independently, however, our results suggest that ACOs should keep some, if not all, of the savings in cases of overlap with bundled payment programs-ideally to the extent that savings are attributable to ACO efforts. More generally, bundled payment programs that place hospitals at risk for postacute care spending may not be the only viable strategy to curb excessive postacute care. Our findings also challenge claims by leaders of health care provider organizations that mergers and acquisitions involving acute care or postacute care facilities are necessary for achieving more efficient postacute care under new payment models. More generally, the ability of ACOs to curb postacute care spending exemplifies the potential for health care professionals to influence care across multiple settings without necessarily establishing common ownership over the full continuum of care, as few ACOs own SNFs.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, the MSSP is a voluntary program and ACOs likely differ from nonparticipating providers. Postacute care spending levels and trends were similar for ACO and non-ACO providers during the precontract period, however, and we would not expect ACOs to reduce their use of postacute care without an incentive to do so. Second, reductions in SNF use and length of stay for ACO patients conditional on hospital or SNF admission could have been due to differential changes in the case mix resulting from reductions in hospital or SNF admissions. However, we found no evidence of differential changes in patient characteristics, consistent with hospital and SNF admission rates decreasing in proportion to patients' risk of admission.
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Third, our analysis did not support inferences about substitution of postacute care settings. For example, our finding of lower use of postacute care facilities for ACO patients with no change in use of postacute home health care could be due to both a substitution of postacute home care for facility care and an accompanying reduction in both postacute and outpatient home care for other patients, but our results reflect only the net effects.
Conclusions
Participation in the MSSP has been associated with significant reductions in postacute care spending without ostensible changes in quality, suggesting gains in the value of health care. Postacute care spending reductions were more consistent with efforts by clinicians working within hospitals and SNFs to influence care for ACO patients than with hospitalwide initiatives by ACOs or use of preferred SNFs. Understanding such early successes can support regulatory policy that enhances rather than inhibits the effectiveness of payment and delivery system reforms. 
eAppendix. Additional Methods
A. Attributing beneficiaries to ACOs or non-ACO providers
We followed the MSSP attribution rules to assign each beneficiary in each study year to the ACO or non-ACO TIN that accounted for the most allowed charges for primary care services received by the beneficiary in that year, but made 3 modifications to the attribution algorithm to achieve greater balance between comparison groups and across years and to reflect recent changes. Our approach is described elsewhere 1 and is summarized below. Specifically, first, we attributed beneficiaries based on outpatient primary care services (current procedural terminology [CPT] codes 99201-99215, G0402, G0438, and G0439) but not physician services provided in nursing facilities or other settings (99304-99318, 99324-99340, and 99341-99350) that have been included in the definition of primary care services in the MSSP rules. We excluded these latter services from consideration because nursing facilities (or physicians working in nursing facilities)
are underrepresented in ACO contracts, as demonstrated in prior work. 2 Consequently, inclusion of these services would cause the ACO group to be systematically different from the control group. For example, high-cost beneficiaries receiving both outpatient primary care and post-acute care in a given year could be attributed to the non-ACO TIN providing their post-acute care even if they receive the plurality of their outpatient primary care from an ACO. 3 Our exclusion of physician services in nursing facilities also reflects recent changes to the rules for patient attribution, which now exclude physician visits in SNFs from the attribution algorithm because their inclusion causes particularly sick patients with significant post-acute care needs to be attributed away from ACOs. 3, 4 These high-cost patients are likely to be targets of care management efforts by ACOs but, under the original rules, would not be attributed to an ACO if they received more care at SNFs than primary care at the ACO.
Second, we further limited attribution to step 1 of the MSSP algorithm, in which beneficiaries with at least one primary care services from a primary care physician (PCP) are attributed to the ACO or non-ACO TIN accounting for the plurality of allowed charges for primary care services provided by PCPs. PCPs are defined by claim specialty codes for internal medicine, family practice, general practice, or geriatric medicine. We did not include in our analysis beneficiaries without any primary care services from a PCP, who are attributed in step 2 of the algorithm on the basis of primary care services received from non-PCP providers. As described in the Methods, we did this because many ACOs in the MSSP only have PCPs in their contracting networks. Thus, beneficiaries attributed via step 2 would be preferentially assigned to the control group since they could not be attributed to ACOs with only PCPs. As demonstrated in prior work, 1 pre-contract differences in annual total Medicare spending between ACOs and the control group were greater when employing both steps of the algorithm than when employing step 1 only. Thus, limiting attribution to outpatient primary care services provided by PCPs achieved better balance between comparison groups.
Third, we included outpatient specialty consultations (CPT codes 99241-99245) in the set of outpatient primary care services used for attribution because these codes were eliminated from the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule starting in 2010. Thereafter, physicians instead used office visit codes in the 99201-99215 range to bill for consultations. 5 Thus, including outpatient specialty consultation codes ensured consistency over the study period in the services considered in beneficiary attribution. Results were similar to our main analysis.
In a second sensitivity analysis, we redefined each ACO as a fixed collection of ACOs as fixed sets of NPIs should also introduce some attenuation bias, for example by causing some misattribution of patients to ACOs in years before their physician joined a practice in an ACO or after their physician left a practice in an ACO. Estimates from analyses using these NPI-based definitions of ACOs were substantively similar and did not alter our conclusions.
C. ACOs subgroup analyses
As described in the Methods, our primary interest was to compare ACOs that are independent physician groups or collections of physician groups with ACOs financially integrated with hospitals. Because prior research has demonstrated that overall ACO savings differ by measures of baseline efficiency, when comparing independent physician groups with hospital-integrated groups, we also allowed differential changes in use and spending to differ by baseline SNF use in ACO service areas and baseline SNF use for
ACOs' attributed populations relative to regional averages. Specifically, we categorized ACOs according to whether risk-adjusted SNF use (annual number of SNF days per beneficiary among hospitalized beneficiaries) in their service area at baseline was above or below the median among ACO service areas, and we categorized ACOs according to whether risk-adjusted SNF use in their attributed population was above or below average SNF in their service area for the control group.
We applied previously described methods to estimate these baseline levels, for independent physician groups than for hospital-integrated groups across ACO cohorts and analyses, contributing to previously described greater savings among independent physician groups, 1,7 but these subgroups differences in inpatient and SNF spending were not statistically significant (eFigure, Panels A-C). Of note, comparisons of independent physician groups with hospital-integrated groups that were not adjusted for subgroup .20 a SNF denotes skilled nursing facility. IRF denotes inpatient rehabilitation facility. LTCH denotes long-term care hospital. b Inpatient facility spending did not include capital, disproportionate hospital, or indirect medical education payments. To adjust for between-hospital differences in Medicare payments for admissions in the same diagnosis-related group, we standardized inpatient facility spending by calculating a national mean payment for each DRG and summing mean payments across admissions for each beneficiary rather than actual Medicare payments. Estimates were not appreciably changed by this standardization. 
